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INTRODUCTION
It’s March 10, 2010 and John Doe is returning home to New York from a business
trip in Mumbai. He has a minor cough, but feels just fine despite the fact that he is
incubating the first pandemic horror of the 21st century. He’s already contagious, and the
virus is airborne. By the time the Airbus A380 lands, a sizable portion of the 555
passengers have been exposed.1 Half of the passengers stay in New York, while the other
half make their connecting flights to Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Dallas, and
elsewhere. It takes another 3-4 days before John realizes that he isn’t battling a run of the
mill flu. By the time he gets to the emergency room, he is running a fever of 106. John
dies shortly thereafter. The doctors, learning that John recently made a trip to Africa,
know to contact public health officials. Two days later, as the virus is discovered to be
something novel, emergency procedures go into action to contact all those who were
potentially exposed. Passengers of John’s flight begin to pour into emergency rooms
across the country. Two weeks after the flight landed, most of those exposed to the virus
on the plane are dead. The virus has continued to spread despite the efforts of the Centers
for Disease Control (CDC) and states’ Departments of Health to quarantine and isolate
those who were potentially exposed.
Researchers discover that Jane, the person sitting immediately next to John on the
plane, never developed symptoms. However, her blood tests indicate that she was
definitely exposed. After several more horrendous weeks, it becomes apparent that a
small group of people, perhaps 1 in 10 million, has a natural immunity to the devastating
pandemic. These people have no trace of the virus in their systems. The virus poses no
threat to them, and they pose no threat to anybody else. Public health authorities
1
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desperately need access to their bodies to run a series of potentially painful or deadly
trials which together have a small probability of producing an effective treatment against
the virus. However, this small group of genetically gifted individuals expressly refuses to
participate in any research whatsoever. This paper will examine the ethical frameworks
for dealing with just such a doomsday scenario.2
The above scenario is one not contemplated by our current public health
institutions. At first blush it may seem as though the law has already dealt with the
doomsday hypothetical (hereinafter doomsday). For example, the law grants the state
governments wide latitude in dealing with public health emergencies under the 10th
amendment to the Constitution, which grants the states police powers.3 However, there
are two key differences between doomsday and all previous exercises of the police
power. First, in all previous scenarios, the exercise of authority over an individual has
conferred a benefit on the individual. However, in doomsday Jane and her cohort have
nothing to fear from the virus, and would receive no direct benefit from the research.4
Second, in all previous scenarios, government exercise of authority over an individual has
been premised on protecting society from that individual.5 Here, Jane and the others do
not carry the virus and pose no direct threat to society. These differences have profound
ethical implications which have not been dealt with before. Not only have we never
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answered the question of whether or not a person in Jane’s condition may be compelled,
but it is a question that must be addressed before we are confronted with it in real life.
The goal of this paper is to encourage prior debate about what limits the
government should be subjected to when doomsday is fast approaching. The question of
whether or not the government should be able to force an individual to submit to
potentially harmful research in an emergency situation where there is no possibility of
benefiting the individual, and where the individual is not a threat to anyone is one which
must not be addressed in the heat of a raging pandemic. Ethical choices must not be made
based on emotionally charged rhetoric, but should rather be made with appeals to cool
reason.6 There are 3 other reasons we should address the question prior to having it thrust
upon us.
First, if we as a democratic society make the decision to strip the genetically gifted
people in the doomsday scenario of their rights to bodily integrity and autonomy as a
hypothetical, then Jane herself will have in some way taken part in the debate. In this
way, we perhaps avoid the charges of exploitation that we would otherwise be subject to
if we decide to use Jane’s body for the furtherance of society.7 The more fair and open
the debate, the less exploitative any decisions arising out of that debate could be
considered because everyone will have had an opportunity to be heard.
Second, the death toll from a new pandemic or from a bioterrorism attack could
easily stretch into the seven figures.8 This vast potential harm requires a rapid response
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capability. If we are confronted with tough ethical and legal questions in the midst of a
doomsday scenario, our response could very easily be bogged down by a series of court
injunctions and confused legislative actions. Thus a lack of legal and ethical preparedness
will compound the effects of a naturally occurring pandemic or bioterrorist attack.
Third, if the doomsday scenario is brought to life as an act of terrorism, we must be
especially vigilant in protecting against the perception of extra-constitutional government
action. One of the goals of terrorism is to use fear to force democratic societies to
undermine their own legitimacy.9 In the heat of a bio-terrorism event, if we were to allow
Jane and her cohort to be limitlessly used by the government we would open ourselves to
much criticism, and would undermine the legitimacy of our own systems. Rather, by
debating the appropriate steps prior to the doomsday scenario, we can democratically
create emergency mechanisms that while potentially quite harsh have been reconciled
with our constitution and with our consciences.
American culture - social, economic, and legal - has always been founded on
notions of individual liberty. It’s not surprising that this is so because the founding
fathers themselves were highly influenced by the liberal thinkers of their day. The
constitution they drafted and the institutions that they created were infused with this
liberal ideology. The Declaration of Independence grounded the philosophical
justification for breaking away from England in the social contract theory.10 It declared
that, “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive
of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
9
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Government. . ..”11 Thomas Jefferson did not limit the underpinnings of the Declaration
of Independence to social contract theory, but also appealed to the more austere
deontological theories of Kant. The Declaration of Independence famously states that,
“all men are created equal” and that all men are endowed with “unalienable rights.”12
Despite the strong respect of individual liberties, the founding fathers were also
influenced by notions of Utilitarianism, and perhaps even by a small degree of
Communitarianism. In part one of this paper, the ethical theories of John Locke, John
Rawls, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mills, and various communitarians will be
considered. Each of these ethical frameworks would approach the doomsday hypothetical
differently. An analysis of these differences will give us the tools necessary for crafting a
rational ethical approach to the doomsday scenario. In part two of this paper, the limited
legal precedent for government compulsion in the public health context will be
considered. This precedent is important as it provides the starting point from which the
ethical approaches in part one will need to begin. In part three of this paper, analogous
situations in which the government either is or is not allowed to interfere with individual
liberty will be examined. The differences between these analogous scenarios and the
possible rationale for those differences will shed light on which of the ethical frameworks
is most likely to be used in constructing an alternative response to emergency public
health concerns.

Part I
Ethical Frameworks

11
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A. John Locke

The founding fathers were probably most influenced by the liberal social contract
theoreticians. Lawrence Gostin has observed that, “Liberalism has become the de facto
political philosophy in late twentieth and early twenty-first century America.”13
Therefore that is where our analysis will begin.
Social contract theory is based on two major premises. The first premise is that all
people possess certain “natural rights.”14 These rights include the right to liberty or
autonomy, the right to property, and the right to the pursuit of happiness. Essentially,
liberal theoreticians argue that natural rights are rights of negative liberty.15 This means
that all people have a right to be free of coercion. The second premise is that in the state
of nature, meaning the natural condition of humans without governance, men and women
will compete and fight over scarce resources thereby constantly invading upon one
another’s natural rights. This premise was developed by Thomas Hobbes who famously
declared that in the state of nature the life of man is, “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short.”16
The reconciling of these two conflicting premises is the goal of Social Contract
theory. Because humans are rational and will realize the inherent conflict in the state of
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nature, people will naturally come together and contract to achieve a solution.17 In this
social contract, Locke argues that people agree not to interfere and coerce other people so
long as other people agree not to coerce in turn. Because all contracts need an
enforcement mechanism, government is created to ensure that no person unjustifiably
coerces another.18 This scenario, however, creates the inevitable situation in which a
government has been empowered to coerce its citizens. Locke dealt with this problem by
declaring that if a government breaches its part of the social contract, by either not
providing protection from coercion, or by itself impeding the liberty of its subjects, then
the subjects had a right and a duty to rise up and over-throw the government. This last
part of Locke’s argument is what the colonists seized upon in the Declaration of
Independence.
On the surface, Social Contract theory doesn’t leave much room for public health
law and the attendant invasions of personal liberty inherent in that law. Disease is hardly
coercion from which the government is bound to protect citizens. How then could public
health intervention which substantially impedes a liberty interest be justified? There are
two possible answers provided under traditional Social Contract theory.
First, when Locke spoke of a Social Contract he of course wasn’t envisioning a
constitution that every citizen read upon the age of majority and then signed onto. Rather,
he saw it is an imaginary pact between citizen and government in which a citizen’s
acceptance of the benefits of that pact equaled tacit agreement to its terms.19 A defender
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of public health intervention would argue that interventions such as vaccinations,
quarantine, and mandatory screening confer a benefit on the individual. The benefit of
vaccinations, for instance, is that if my neighbor has been vaccinated, he is far less likely
to spread illness to me. Therefore, the acceptance by the individual of the benefit is
acquiescence to the term that the individual will submit to the intervention if it is
required. This rationale is only partially applicable to the doomsday scenario. Jane would
receive no direct benefit in exchange for her freedom. Thus, how can she be said to have
tacitly agreed to a term requiring her to surrender her freedom. This essentially amounts
to a “no consideration” argument in contracts. While it is true that in the specific
doomsday scenario Jane will not have agreed to give up her freedom if, before the
doomsday scenario occurred, the legislature had debated and agreed to allow the
infringement of a citizen’s rights in the doomsday scenario, then Jane can be said to have
benefited from that policy. Jane will have benefited from the policy because she would
have gained the security of knowing that if the doomsday scenario occurred and Thomas
had been the genetically gifted party, Jane would have received the benefit of Thomas’s
acquiescence to research. Jane’s benefit is essentially an insurance policy that she may
never need to collect.
Second, the Social Contract should be looked at more broadly than as just a
contract between a single citizen and an amorphous government. Instead, the agreement
is between each and every citizen. As the Supreme Court once opined a “fundamental
principle of the social compact [is] that the whole people covenants with each citizen, and
each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the
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‘common good’.”20 Thus, looked at more generically, Jane could be said to have agreed
to reasonable coercion by the government if it is motivated by an interest in the common
good.21 This reading of the social contract begs the question of whether or not it is
reasonable for the government to inflict harm on one of its citizens when that citizen has
no chance of personally benefiting from the harm. The reasonability of the government’s
coercion must be made on a case by case basis.
Traditional social contract theory provides two rationales which could potentially
justify a substantial invasion of Jane and her cohort’s right to autonomy, and right to
bodily integrity. The next theory we will examine is a modification of social contract
theory proposed by John Rawls, which was aimed at reducing the injustices of traditional
social contract theory.

B. John Rawls

Rawls’ addition to the social contract is to argue that nobody deserves the
handicaps or advantages that they are born into.22 These extraneous factors such as
familial wealth, race, and nationality, are responsible for many of the inequities in today’s
society. Rawls posits that an ethical society would be one in which the terms of the social
contract were agreed upon by the contracting parties without the contractors having any
knowledge of who they are in the real world. These decisions made from “behind the veil
of ignorance” would be more equitable, because as rational actors, the contracting parties
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would realize that they are more likely to be disadvantaged than to be advantaged by
severe inequality.23 Additionally, as the decisions made from behind the veil are
theoretically freely negotiated, none of the permitted impositions on the rights of
individuals violate liberal ideals.
Rawls’ theory of justice provides a useful tool with which to analyze novel ethical
problems. How would our democratic society respond to the doomsday scenario if we
were all operating from behind the veil of ignorance? If decisions were made from behind
the veil, none of the contracting parties would know for sure if they were Jane, or if they
were someone whose life depended on an unlikely successful drug developed at the
expense of Jane’s freedom or life. The contracting parties as rational actors would know
that their chance of being in Jane’s cohort is relatively small when compared to their
chance of being afflicted by the virus. Moreover, rational parties would recognize that not
only their own well being, but the well being of their families and of society itself is at
stake in the doomsday scenario. This realization, however, would not induce a rational
actor to permit terrible atrocities against Jane or any numerical minority. The rational
actors must still consider the small chance that they or someone they care about is a part
of the cohort. Furthermore, the rational party will realize that unrestrained barbarism, if
committed for little or no purpose, will have far reaching negative impacts on the social
fabric, quite apart from the pandemic itself. Thus, we can assume that rational actors
operating from behind the veil of ignorance would permit some amount of invasion of the
bodily integrity of Jane and her cohort, but that this permission would be tempered by
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some type of oversight requiring that the invasion be as minimal as possible, and that it
be done in a reasonable fashion.
The exact form of the restrictions placed on government by a Rawlsian framework
would vary, but they would try to strike a balance between the welfare of all of the
individuals in the society, and the rights of Jane and her cohort to bodily integrity and
personal freedom to be infringed. The next ethical framework we will look at was
proposed by Immanuel Kant.

C. Immanuel Kant

Kant believed that reason could be used to develop a small set of universal ethical
rules which must be respected at all times by all people.24 Further, Kant argued that the
morality of any particular act could not be derived from the overall consequences of that
act, but must be derived from the intention behind the act itself. Id. Kant formulated two
categorical imperatives which he argued must be complied with at all times. The first
categorical imperative states that one should “act in such a way that [one] treats
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always . . . as an end
and never as a means.”25 The second formulation of the categorical imperative states that
one “should never act except in such a way that [one] can also will that [one’s] maxim
should become a universal law.”26 Each of these imperatives has important implications.
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The ends/means imperative was derived from Kant’s understanding that humans
were unique in that they have an autonomous will, and that they possess the ability to
legislate moral law.27 Because this autonomy is what sets people apart from mere things,
Kant argued that we must not take that autonomy away from others. In restricting the
autonomy of others in any way, we begin to treat them like things, which is a moral
evil.28 Kant did not argue that we could never use people, only that we must not use them
purely as a means. This imperative has led Kantians to demand a strong sphere of
protected personal autonomy.29 Kantians have even gone so far as to argue that “coercion
is virtually never appropriate to achieve public health goals [, and that] . . . individuals
have fundamental rights to refuse physical interventions. . ..”30
Kant’s second formulation of the imperative is similar to the golden rule. He posits
that whenever one wills to act in a certain way, that person must consider the
consequences if everyone acted in that way. Furthermore, Kant argued that if one acts in
a certain way, one must be willing to accept that others will act that way towards the
initial actor, and the actor will be considered to have tacitly consented to that behavior.
Kant derives this formulation by saying that if we are to grant respect to each person’s
autonomous will, we must be willing to treat that person as they treat others since that is
the best evidence of how they morally view the world.31 This formulation is used by
Kantians to justify the death penalty because if a person chooses to murder another, that
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person has chosen to inhabit a moral realm where murder is acceptable. Thus, it is
society’s duty to respect the murderer’s will by executing him.32
Using Kant’s end/means formulation of the categorical imperative, how should
society respond to the doomsday scenario? If Jane and her cohort have expressly refused
to participate with researchers, then coercing them under the first imperative would
appear to be using them purely as a means to an end which is not their own. Some
scholars have argued that in the research context, one can never use a subject unless the
subject has consented and has accepted the ends of the researcher as their own ends.33
Any other use turns an individual into a mere object, and denies her right to autonomy.
Because Kant claims that an individual’s right to autonomy should be respected even if
that individual’s behavior hurts herself or another in the process, it appears that even in
the doomsday scenario Kant would not approve of the use of Jane and her cohort.34
Despite the result achieved by using Kant’s ends/means formulation of the
categorical imperative, his golden rule formulation might be used to reach a different
conclusion. The will of Jane and her cohort to not help is an extreme form of selfishness
which would border on the malicious. In the doomsday scenario, Jane and her cohort are
electing to stand from the sidelines and watch as society potentially collapses around
them. This decision to stand on the sidelines is an implicit devaluation of all of the
individuals condemned to die. Thus, government coercion of Jane and her cohort before
they refuse to consent to participate in research would be ethically wrong both because of
the ends/means formulation of the categorical imperative and because society ought not
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to coerce individuals under the second formulation of the categorical imperative lest
society be coerced. Contrastingly, after Jane and her cohort refuse to participate in the
research, their will is an implicit devaluation of the autonomy of individuals opening
themselves up to similar devaluation and forced participation in the public health
research.
Upon initial consideration, the above reasoning which justifies the coerced
participation of Jane may appear to be circular, but the key distinction is in the
chronology. In first allowing Jane and her cohort an opportunity to voluntarily participate
in the research, we are respecting their ability to act autonomously. If we instead used
force immediately, we would be using Jane and the others purely as a means to an ends,
as a mere object. However, after Jane and her cohort have made the selfish choice not to
participate, forced participation in the research is merely respecting the root selfish will
motivating Jane’s decision.
The previous ethical frameworks all evaluated the morality of actions based on the
intrinsic nature of the actions, without regard to the consequences of those actions. The
next framework, championed by John Stuart Mill, focuses much more heavily on the
consequences.

D. John Stuart Mill

Mill was a proponent of Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is the belief that decisions
regarding moral rightness or wrongness can be reduced to a determination of which acts
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will produce the most human happiness for the greatest number of people.35 For Mill, the
maximization of human happiness is the only valid goal of a just government.36 While
Mill subscribed to Utilitarianism, his framework was made more complex by his belief
that individual autonomy was the key to maximizing human happiness. Mill did not
believe that utility could be maximized by a long list of heavy handed government
regulations, rather individuals as autonomous, rational beings were the best suited to
determine their own utility-maximizing behavior.37 As Mill stated “[h]e who lets the
world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other
faculty than the ape-like one of imitation.”38 Mill’s support for individual autonomy was
not limitless. Mill broke behaviors down into 2 categories, self-regarding behaviors and
other-regarding behaviors.39
Self-regarding behaviors are those things an individual does which concern only
her own well being. Because Mill was a staunch supporter of individual autonomy as a
means to maximizing human happiness, he believed that self-regarding behaviors should
be completely off limits to governmental regulation. Regulation of self-regarding
behavior, according to Mill, amounts either to paternalism or moral legislation, both of
which fail to maximize human happiness. If something is truly self-regarding (almost
nothing is totally self-regarding) then even if it is objectively unwise for the individual to
undertake the act, if the individual is rational, she will only take the act if for her it
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maximizes happiness. Thus, Millians reject seat belt laws, motorcycle helmet laws, antismoking laws, and similar restrictions on individual choice.40
Other-regarding behaviors are those things an individual does which directly
impact others. Opining on this category of behaviors, Mill professed his widely known
harm principle, “The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, both the physical and moral, is not sufficient warrant.”41 Thus, other-regarding
behaviors like theft or murder can be constrained by the government because they harm
another. Other-regarding behaviors, in harming another individual, interfere with that
individual’s ability to maximize her own utility. The harm principle then is not an
exception to Mill’s utilitarianism, it is just a clarification.
In analyzing how a Millian would approach the doomsday scenario, the question
that must first be answered is whether Jane’s behavior is self-regarding. If Jane’s
behavior is self-regarding, then Mill would argue that the government ought not to coerce
her. The choice not to participate in the research seems self-regarding. The choice not to
participate is rarely thought of as an affirmative choice to interfere with others. However,
in this instance, Jane’s choice is more like opting out of a necessary regulatory regime. It
is as though Jane decided not to pay her taxes. Jane’s decision not to pay taxes while not
actively harmful, has a negative impact on every single person in her community both in
terms of a greater financial burden and in terms of encouraging others to free ride.
If Jane’s decision is classified as other-regarding, the next step is to apply Mill’s
harm principle. The harm principle allows the government to coerce an individual if
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doing so would prevent harm to others. Importantly, it does not limit government
coercion to preventing an individual from personally harming others.42 Consequently,
despite the fact that Jane herself is not the cause of the harm, Mill would allow her to be
coerced in order to prevent harm to others. Once it is determined that Jane can be
coerced, a simple calculation taking into consideration that “health is necessary for much
of the joy, creativity, and productivity that each person derives from life,” and that a
much greater number of people could be helped than would be hurt, should conclude that
coercion of Jane and her cohort would be the happiness maximizing option.

F. Communitarians

Communitarians reject the liberal belief that individuals possess rights which
necessarily supersede the rights of the community as a whole. Rather, they argue that
communities ought to be the primary point of reference we use when developing a moral
framework. To support their premise that society is the a priori moral actor,
communitarians make a couple of different arguments.43 First, they argue that humans are
intrinsically social animals. Humans lack all concept of the self if community is taken
away.44 Community, for instance, provides us with language, values, meaning, and
relationships.45 We cannot reproduce the species alone, and we can’t be maximally
productive alone. We depend on long-term cooperative communal arrangements.46
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Second, Communitarians argue that individual freedom is only meaningful if it is
enforced by some community mechanism.47 Without social enforcement and respect of
individual liberties, individual liberties would be meaningless.48 Therefore,
communitarians argue that communities are the primary rights holders.
As primary rights holders, communities ought to establish ethical frameworks
which support the well being of the community as a whole. In the public health context,
Lawrence Gostin argues that: “Without minimal levels of health, populations cannot fully
engage in the social, economic, and political interactions necessary for community
survival. Health is foundational for engaging in many aspects of public life . . . Public
health, then, becomes a transcendent value because a basic level of human functioning is
a prerequisite for engaging in activities that are critical to communities.”49
Communitarians in the doomsday scenario would almost certainly allow for the
coercion of Jane and her cohort. Communitarians, as primarily concerned with the well
being of the whole community, would be willing to subject some individuals to coercive
research, if that community decided that the harm caused by the coercion to the
community would be outweighed by the benefits of the research. A recent analysis of the
SARS epidemic suggests that heavy handed public health measures in China drove some
of the ill into hiding instead of into the arms of the medical profession.50 This effect
potentially accounts for some of the greater virulence of SARS in China as opposed to
Canada where public health measures were much more voluntary.51 Essentially, in the
47

Id.
Id.
49
Gostin, Lawrence O. “When Terrorism Threatens Health: How far are limitations on personal and
economic liberties justified?” 55 Fla. L. Rev. 1105, 1157 (Dec. 2003)
50
Ries, Nola M. “Public Health Law and Ethics: Lessons from SARS and Quarantine.” Health Law Review
vol. 12 num. 1 (2005).
51
Id.
48

19

communitarian framework, the question asked is what is the best solution for the
community in a holistic sense. In the doomsday scenario where the very life of the
community is threatened, the answer would likely be that the forced participation of Jane
and her cohort in research is what is best for the community.
Having examined the various ethical frameworks for dealing with the doomsday
scenario this paper will now look at how the law has dealt with coercion in the public
health context in the past, and at how it would likely deal with the doomsday scenario if it
were to occur today.

Part II
Legal Frameworks

A. Public Health Powers

This section will briefly summarize from whence the government derives it public
health powers. When the colonies gave up their independence to the Federal Government,
they retained their police power in the 10th Amendment to the Constitution.52 This power
reserved to the states the authority to protect the public’s health and safety.53
Consequently, most public health law is state law. While most public health decisions are
handled as a matter of state law, the police power of states obviously is still limited by the
Constitution. Moreover, the Federal government has several methods for intervening in
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the public health. First, the government, via the commerce clause, is permitted to regulate
those things which may have an impact on interstate commerce.54 Thus, the director of
the CDC can take reasonable measures to stop the spread of disease if the director
determines that local efforts are insufficient to halt the spread.55 Second, the Federal
government has the authority to control the movement of people in and out of the country
to prevent the spread of contagious diseases.56 Lastly, because the Federal government
has a duty to see to the national defense, if an act of bioterrorism is suspected, the Federal
government has the authority to conduct public health interventions.57 In the next section
we will look at how public health provisions have been applied to quarantines, forced
inoculations, and compelling one individual to help another.

B. Public Health Cases

Coercive quarantine is one of the police powers available to states in responding to
public health emergencies.58 In Barmore, Mrs. Barmore was confined to her residence by
the health officials of Chicago as a carrier of Typhoid. Mrs. Barmore was not suffering
from any symptoms, but several of her borders had become infected with Typhoid. Mrs.
Barmore pleaded with the court to be released from quarantine. The Barmore court
denied Mrs. Barmore’s plea stating, “[t]hat the preservation of the public health is one of
the duties devolving upon the state as a sovereign power will not be questioned. Among
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all the objects sought to be secured by governmental laws none is more important than
the preservation of public health.”59 The court went on to say that legislatures should be
granted great deference when regulating the public health, and that as long as the
interventions are not “arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable,” the courts should not
review the regulations.60 Clarifying when courts should step in, the Barmore court held
that a person could not be forcefully quarantined upon mere suspicion, but that if there
was a reasonable belief that the person could be harming others, that person could be
quarantined.
The Barmore court, intentionally or not, based its justification for coerced
quarantine both in Social Contract theory, and in Utilitarianism. The Court’s reference to
the duty of the state to provide for the public health is an appeal to the state’s contractual
duty to protect its citizens. Furthermore, the fact that Mrs. Barmore probably benefited
from the quarantine of other individuals infected with other diseases in her community
means that she tacitly approved of the practice of quarantine, and was therefore bound to
submit to it. The Barmore Court’s limitation of coerced quarantine to those individuals
who were likely to harm other individuals as a result of being a carrier, is a perfect
application of Mill’s harm principle. In other words, the autonomy interest of Mrs.
Barmore could not justly be interfered with unless it was shown that not interfering in her
autonomy interest would likely lead her to harm other individuals.
The decision in Barmore unfortunately sheds only a little light on the doomsday
scenario. Barmore dealt with the quarantining of a person who if not constrained would
have been the source of harm to others. Jane and her cohort, on the other hand, are not the
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initiators of harm. It could be argued that Mrs. Barmore, though the source of harm, is no
different than Jane in that neither Jane nor Mrs. Barmore would have chosen to be in the
position that they are in. Neither Jane nor Mrs. Barmore intended to cause harm. Despite
this similarity, the fact that Mrs. Barmore is the genesis of harm is a substantial
difference. Moreover, Mrs. Barmore was not likely to be injured by her quarantine,
beyond the injury of confinement, and may even have received some medical benefit.
Mrs. Barmore could have been cured of her condition, thus, enabling her to leave
quarantine and to re-enter her normal life, whereas Jane in the doomsday scenario would
not receive any direct benefit and could be left substantially worse off. What Barmore
does teach is that the courts are likely to refer to Social Contract and Utilitarian
frameworks when confronting ethical issues in the public health context.
Another landmark public health case dealt with the issue of mandatory
vaccinations.61 In Jacobson, Mr. Jacobson refused to submit to a small pox vaccination in
contravention of a city ordinance requiring all able bodied people to be vaccinated. The
court upheld the statute, appealing to multiple ethical frameworks including Social
Contract theory, Utilitarianism, and even Communitarianism.
As quoted supra the Jacobson Court believed that the “whole people covenants
with each citizen” for the common good.62 Mr. Jacobson definitely received the benefit of
living in a community in which most of the citizens had been inoculated against small
pox. Thus, under a Lockian Social Contract model, he can be said to have tacitly
consented to mandatory vaccinations.
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The appeal to Utilitarianism made by the Jacobson Court once again refers to the
harm principle. The court held that “real liberty for all could not exist under the operation
of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own,
whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done
to others.”63 Thus, Mr. Jacobson’s liberty reaches its limit when his actions potentially
harm others in his community.
Finally, the Jacobson court appeals to Communitarian principles. The court states
that “[u]pon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the
right to protect itself against an epidemic disease. . ..”64 The Court here isn’t speaking of
the right of individuals to be protected from disease, but rather is justifying the
interference with the bodily integrity of an individual for society’s well being. It is odd to
see an American court appealing to Communitarian principles, but in the context of
public health, Communitarian principles seem to be almost if not equally as important as
traditional American liberal ethical principles.
Like Barmore, there are several key differences between Jacobson and the
doomsday scenario. Mr. Jacobson was being coerced into receiving a small pox
vaccination. The vaccine was unlikely to do him any harm.65 In fact, small pox is a
devastatingly lethal virus, and the vaccine would have likely conferred a strong health
benefit on Mr. Jacobson. Contrastingly, Jane and her cohort are not being coerced into
something that is objectively beneficial to them. On the contrary, the hypothetical
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suggests that Jane et al are being potentially coerced into dangerous and painful
procedures. The second key difference is that Jane et al do not pose a direct risk to
society whereas Mr. Jacobson by not being vaccinated was creating the risk of
introducing small pox into his community. Jacobson is more similar to the doomsday
scenario than Barmore, because in Jacobson, while Mr. Jacobson could be thought of as
potentially harming the community, an equally valid framing would look at him as
simply refusing to confer a benefit on the community. This refusal to confer a benefit is
the same driving force behind the doomsday scenario. While this case gets us closer to
judicial precedent concerning the doomsday scenario, it is not perfect; it does however
indicate that Social Contract theory, Utilitarianism, and Communitarianism can all play a
part in grappling with public health conundrums.
While the courts have been solicitous of the greater good in most public health
cases, they are less likely to condone coercion in more personal cases.66 In McFall, Mr.
McFall was a patient suffering from a likely terminal bone marrow disease. His cousin
had been determined to be a match, and had his cousin consented to a procedure, Mr.
McFall’s likelihood of survival would have improved dramatically. Unfortunately, Mr.
McFall’s cousin refused to consent to the procedure, thereby condemning Mr. McFall to
an untimely demise. The court, though sympathetic to Mr. McFall, denied his plea for
relief.
The underlying rational of the McFall court drew heavily from Kant, declaring that
individuals have an absolute right to their bodily integrity. The court opined that “[f]or a
society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular vein
or neck of one of its members and suck from its sustenance for another member, is
66
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revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence. Forcible extraction of living
body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind.”67
What light does McFall shed on the doomsday scenario? The biggest difference
between McFall and the doomsday scenario is that in McFall, the court was being asked
to compel one individual for the sake of another individual. Contrastingly, the doomsday
scenario asks for a small handful of people to be compelled for the sake of a great many
people. Additionally, because of the possible devastation of a run-away pandemic, one
could frame the doomsday scenario as a handful of people being compelled for the sake
of society, and not for the sake of any particular individuals. Despite this difference, there
are several key similarities between McFall and doomsday. First, in McFall, the cousin
was not a cause of the harm, but was uniquely suited to relieve the harm. Similarly in
doomsday, Jane and her cohort don’t cause the virus, but are uniquely situated to
meliorate its effects. Second, the cousin in McFall would not have received any benefit
for assisting McFall. Similarly, Jane et al will not receive any foreseeable benefit for
participating in the research.
While McFall and the doomsday scenario are similar, the result in McFall would
not control in the doomsday scenario for two reasons. The first and probably most
important reason is the difference in the number of people receiving the potential benefit
from coercion. A 1:1 ratio is radically different from a 10:1 ratio, and the doomsday
scenario envisions something much closer to a 1,000,000:1 ratio than to a 1:1 ratio.
The second reason is that traditional American formulations of Social Contract
theory, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and even Communitarianism would not have
provided an ethical basis for Mr. McFall’s request. Social Contract theory falls short
67
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because as no compelled live tissue donation had ever occurred or been debated, it is
impossible to argue that McFall’s cousin had tacitly agreed to it as a term in the social
contract. McFall’s cousin had never been put on notice that compelled tissue donation
was part of the social contract in America. Moreover, a Rawlsian would probably not
argue that someone operating from behind the veil of ignorance would give anyone with
a donor match to anyone else a claim to that person’s tissues. A person behind the veil
may at first be tempted to approve of compelled tissue donation, after all, many people
require some type of tissue donation over the course of their lives. However, a society
where at anytime someone might lay claim to parts of your body, be it bone marrow,
eggs, sperm, blood, a retina, a kidney, or anything else, would be a fear society.
Utilitarians would apply the harm principle to the coercive demands of Mr. McFall, and
would declare that his attempted coercion of his cousin was an immoral act. To lay claim
to another person’s tissue is clearly other regarding behavior, and the potential to bring
harm to that person in claiming the tissue means that compelled tissue donation would
run afoul of the harm principle. Finally, Communitarians with their concerns being
focused on the rights of society at large would be unlikely to allow one individual the
right to another individual’s body. The social harm wrought by widespread compelled
tissue donation would likely outweigh the benefits achieved in the handful of cases where
a successful donor is identified yet refuses to donate. Thus, the differences between
McFall and the doomsday scenario, while not large, are significant enough to lead to
drastically different ethical conclusions.
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Having gained an understanding for how courts have dealt with public health issues
in the past, we will now look at how they would likely address the doomsday scenario
were it to arise today.

C. Likely Legal Response to Doomsday

If the doomsday scenario were to happen today, some Federal agency would likely
attempt to coerce Jane et al as a means of averting catastrophe. Jane et al would ask a
court to intervene, and it would almost certainly would. The case would eventually land
in front of the Supreme Court, but not before much time and life would likely have been
lost. Lawrence Gostin argues that in this eventuality, the Supreme Court would likely
analyze the coercion of Jane under a strict scrutiny approach, because the compulsion of
Jane would likely be considered a violation of a fundamental right to bodily integrity
under Cruzan v. Director Mo. Dept. of Health.68 Under strict scrutiny, the exercise of
compulsory powers by the government would not be allowed unless 1. the government
could show a compelling purpose behind the coercion, 2.the government could show a
close connection between the means of the coercion and the compelling ends, and 3. that
the coercion is the least restrictive alternative.69 Under this test, an order coercing Jane
and her cohort to submit to research would be unlikely to be upheld.
The first prong of strict scrutiny requiring a compelling state interest in invading
the bodily integrity of Jane and her cohort would likely be met. In the doomsday
scenario, all of society is potentially at risk. If enough people were to fall victim to
68
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disease, the economy, the culture, and all social processes would grind to a halt. Not only
are these overarching impacts part of the government’s interest in compelling Jane et al,
but there is also an interest in simply saving the lives of its citizens. Short of the
avoidance of nuclear war, it is hard to imagine a more compelling interest than the
government’s interest in stemming the effects of a devastating pandemic. Thus the Court
would move on to consider the next prong of strict scrutiny.
The second prong of strict scrutiny, which requires the means of the
intervention to be closely related to the ends, may not be met. This means/ends
requirement is designed to limit irrational and capricious government action.
Unfortunately, in the doomsday scenario, the likelihood that the invasion of Jane’s bodily
integrity will result in a generalizable treatment before the pandemic has run its course is
very small. Furthermore, even if research were likely to lead to a treatment eventually,
each individual breach of Jane’s bodily integrity would likely be little more than a shot in
the dark. Consequently, the Supreme Court would be hard pressed to conclude that the
compelled participation of Jane and her cohort in research would be sufficiently related to
the goal of stopping a pandemic.
The third prong of strict scrutiny requiring that the invasion of bodily integrity be
the least restrictive alternative to accomplish the desired ends would probably not be met
either. Because the likelihood that research on Jane and her cohort would yield a helpful
treatment is so small, other less invasive methods for coming up with an effective
treatment in time may be just as good. These methods might include computer modeling,
animal research, research on infected people, etc. While these methods are undoubtedly
unlikely to arrive at a useful result, they may not be less likely to arrive at a useful result
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than the coercion of Jane. Moreover, the government would first need to try to be
minimally invasive with Jane and her cohort. They could try to offer her incentives to
participate, or could begin research in the least invasive ways possible. This attempt to be
minimally invasive, even if successful at passing the third prong of the strict scrutiny
analysis would take valuable time away from the response to the pandemic.
It appears as though the coerced participation of Jane in the doomsday scenario
would not survive strict scrutiny. Additionally, even if the coercion did survive strict
scrutiny, the question is close enough that it would consume a great deal of time before
being answered. This consumption of time is unacceptable in the doomsday scenario. The
current strict scrutiny approach is not the appropriate method to deal with complex public
health emergencies. A more streamlined predetermined process must be put into place so
that valuable time is not lost debating the ethical questions.
Because the current legal approach to the doomsday scenario is insufficient, the
next section will look at which of the ethical frameworks might be used to develop an
alternative legal approach to public health emergencies.

Part III
An Alternative Response to Public Health Emergencies.

This part of the paper will compare situations which are analogous to the
doomsday scenario and where the government compels individuals with situations that
are analogous to the doomsday scenario, but where the government does not compel
individuals. The goal of this comparison is to expose which ethical frameworks
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predominately determine whether or not government coercion is proper in a given
situation. Using this framework, an alternative response to public health emergencies can
be developed.

A. Analogous situations in which the government compels individuals.

There are three major characteristics of the doomsday scenario shared by all of the
following analogies: (1) the individual is compelled to confer a benefit on a group, (2) the
individual is not directly responsible for the harm (3) the individual will likely be harmed
in some way by the government coercion, above and beyond the intrinsic harm of being
coerced.
The first situation in which the government coerces individuals in a way analogous
to the doomsday scenario is in the context of compelled testimony. Just as the doomsday
scenario extracts a potential cure for a societal ill (pandemic) against the will of an
individual, compelled testimony extracts a potential cure for a societal ill (crime) against
the will of the individual who is compelled. Additionally, just as the compelled individual
in the doomsday scenario is not responsible for the harm that they are being forced to
abate, neither is the compelled individual testifying in court necessarily involved with the
crime they are testifying about. Finally, just as the compelled participation in research is
likely to cause some degree of harm to the compelled individual, so too is compelled
testimony likely to cause harm to an individual. Individuals who are compelled to testify
are harmed both in that they give up a part of their autonomy, and in that they open
themselves up to potential reprisals from those whom they testify against.
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The second analogous example of government coercion is the draft. Conscription
forces an individual to confer a benefit on society against his or her will, in the form of
military service. Furthermore, conscription compels people who have not necessarily
taken part in starting the military conflict that necessitated the use of the draft. Finally,
conscripted soldiers run a substantial risk of being harmed. In fact, the U.S. uses
professional troops whenever possible partly because conscripted soldiers are much
poorer soldiers, and therefore might be at greater risk of harm.70
These two examples are structurally identical to the likely government coercion in
the doomsday scenario. We shall now look at which ethical frameworks justify
compelled testimony and the draft.
1. Social Contract theory can justify both compelled testimony and the draft in two
ways. First, social contract theorists could argue that tacit consent exists for both the draft
and for compelled testimony. Both issues have received lengthy debate in the public
sphere be it protests to the draft, or judicial challenges to compelled testimony. The
decision to reside in the U.S. knowing that both policies are in effect, and the decision to
receive the benefit of both policies in the form of national security and public safety,
equals tacit consent to abide by the policies. Second, a Rawlsian approach could justify
both policies. A decision made from behind the veil would likely agree to allow both
forced conscription and compelled testimony. Conscription, as long as it was handled
justly, could be necessary to protect the lives of all the individuals in the society. Thus,
the contracting parties would likely see it as a necessary step towards achieving national
security. Similarly, the contracting parties would likely see compelled testimony as a
necessary means of enforcing the other agreed upon laws. If witnesses could not be
70
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compelled, criminal justice might severely suffer, which would threaten the social
contract.
2. Kant’s ethical framework would likely reject both compelled testimony and the
draft. The categorical imperative that individuals not be used solely as a means to an end
is violated by both conscription and compelled testimony. The draft potentially takes an
individual against his or her express wishes and places him or her into military service. It
does not do this for the individual, but does this solely to reach a particular end: either
conquest or self-defense. It is the desperate nature of the draft which makes it treat
individuals solely as a means. As far as compelled testimony is concerned, it uses the
witness as though the witness were merely a video camera. Through non-leading
extensive questioning, compelled testimony seeks simply to show to the court the
physical perceptions of the witness so that the fact finder can come to its own
determinations. Therefore, Kant would not approve of either the draft or of compelled
testimony.
3. John Stuart Mill’s branch of utilitarianism would probably approve of both the
draft and compelled testimony. Mill’s respect for an individual’s autonomy as the best
means of maximizing overall human happiness leaves only the harm principle as an
exception to the ban on government coercion. Mill would probably think of a choice to
not testify or a choice to not serve in the military as other-regarding behavior. These
decisions to not act are not like decisions to use an illicit drug in the privacy of one’s own
home, rather the decision to not assist in a war effort, or the decision to not testify against
a criminal are decisions which directly impact others. Once the decisions to not
participate in the draft or to testify is understood as other-regarding behavior, Mill would
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apply the harm principle. As a rule Utilitarian, Mill’s harm principle asks whether an
individual’s behavior if adopted as a general rule would cause harm.71 The answer in the
contexts of the draft and compelled testimony is almost certainly that harm would be
caused. If everyone chose to disregard the draft, all individuals would be open to
whatever ills conquest would bring. Thus the harm principle justifies the draft. Similarly
if nobody chose to testify in criminal trials, crime would be rampant and the government
would have little ability to protect citizens against it. Therefore, the harm principle
justifies compelled testimony.
4. Communitarians would likely approve of both the draft and compelled
testimony. Because Communitarians put social rights before individual rights,
communitarians would ask very different questions than the other ethical theorists. In the
context of the draft, Communitarians would ask whether society has a right to draft an
individual if necessary for society’s survival. The answer to this question is almost
certainly yes. Individuals derive their identity and meaning from their society;
consequently if society dies, in one sense, so to do the individuals. Therefore, to
communitarians, the survival of society is more important than the survival of any
individual members. Under this framework the draft would be approved. In the context of
compelled testimony Communitarians would ask whether society has a right to compel
testimony if necessary to enforce the laws. The criminal laws of society are what provide
the framework which allows people to cooperate and form large social groups with one
another. If these laws were to weaken because fewer people were willing to testify,
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society could potentially break down. Therefore Communitarians would allow for
compelled testimony.

B. Analogous situations in which the government does not compel individuals.

There are at least two situations which are analogous to the doomsday scenario in
which the government has declined to coerce individuals, compulsory bone marrow
donation, and an affirmative duty to rescue.
A system of compulsory bone marrow donation is similar to the doomsday scenario.
A compulsory donation regime would require all individuals to confer a benefit on
society by providing society with a potential means to combat leukemia or other bone
marrow diseases. This is just like the doomsday scenario, which seeks to produce a
treatment for disease from the biological material of Jane and her cohort. People
compelled to donate would not in any way be responsible for the harm that the bone
marrow donation is supposed to address. Finally, just as in the doomsday scenario, a
potential harm is done to the bone marrow donors. The donors are harmed by the
coercion, by an invasion of their privacy, and by the painful bone marrow extraction
process.
The positive duty to rescue (Good Samaritan requirement) is another analogous
situation. While some states have enacted minor Good Samaritan laws, the penalties for
disregarding them are small, and they only require aid where that aid will not impose a
risk on the potential Good Samaritan.72 A strong Good Samaritan law would require
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individuals to confer a benefit on society by always rendering aid when possible. This
coercive duty to rescue would not only apply where the Good Samaritan was responsible
for the harm he is rescuing the other from. Additionally, this coercive duty to rescue
would potentially harm the Good Samaritan. In almost every rescue situation, there is a
danger present which might ensnare the Good Samaritan as completely as it has ensnared
the individual the Good Samaritan was trying to assist.73
These two examples are structurally identical to the doomsday scenario. We will
now look at which ethical frameworks would justify strong Good Samaritan laws, and a
mandatory bone marrow registry.
1. Social Contract theorists would likely approve of both the Good Samaritan laws
and mandatory bone marrow donation. Just as in the first two analogies, the Social
Contract theorists would appeal to tacit consent, the covenant between every individual
and every other individual, and a behind the veil analysis. Compulsory bone marrow
donation and Good Samaritan laws are perfect examples of tacit consent in a social
contract. If either policy were to be proposed, they would elicit a great deal of public
discourse, and if adopted would confer a potential benefit on everyone in the society.
Therefore, anyone who chose to remain in the society and benefit from a compulsory
donation regime or Good Samaritan laws could be said to have consented to them. The
second basis on which a contract theoretician would support either of these policies is
that if the social contract is between every individual and every other individual for the
common good, then polices which encourage selfless behavior, such as the good
73
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Samaritan law, and policies which save the lives of valuable individuals, such as
mandatory marrow donation, can be said to be in the common good. Lastly, a Rawlsian
approach would also support these two policies. Rational contracting parties behind the
veil will recognize that they are at least as likely to need a bone marrow transplant or a
life saving rescue at some point during their lives as they are to have the opportunity to
donate bone marrow or to make a rescue. Moreover, a bone marrow donation, while
painful, is not deadly and a rescue, while dangerous, is less likely to lead to injury than
being in a situation which requires rescue and not having rescue arrive. Thus, any rational
actor in the original position would have been willing to agree to a compulsory donation
regime, and strong Good Samaritan laws.
2. A Kantian ethical framework would likely not permit either mandatory bone
marrow donation or Good Samaritan laws. Both of these analogous situations would
violate the categorical imperative that individuals not be used purely as a means to an
end. Mandatory bone marrow donation would exist purely to transfer life saving
biological material from one person to another. The coercion of the donor is done purely
for the prospective donee’s benefit, and the biological material taken from the donor is
treated as a mere object. Essentially, the donor is just a Petri dish used to grow life-giving
tissue. Thus, Kant would probably not support government coercion in this instance.
Similarly, Good Samaritan laws treat the Good Samaritan as an automaton. The ends of
the law are to benefit society as a whole, and the means is the conveniently placed Good
Samaritan. While Kant’s golden rule formulation of the categorical imperative would
condemn as moral monsters individuals who refuse to donate their bone marrow and
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individuals who refuse to rescue others, this condemnation would not provide an ethical
basis for government coercion.
3. John Stuart Mill would likely approve of both mandatory bone marrow donation
and Good Samaritan laws. Just as in the first two analogies, the decisions to not donate
bone marrow or not to rescue another individual are not self-regarding behaviors. These
decisions directly impact the life chances of other individuals. Therefore, Mill would
apply the harm principle. As a rule Utilitarian, Mill would ask whether a universal refusal
to donate bone marrow would be harmful to individuals. Because it clearly would be
harmful to many people in our society who suffer from bone marrow ailments, Mill
would argue that the government must coerce people to participate in the registry. In the
context of Good Samaritan laws, Mill would ask whether a universal refusal to render aid
to individuals in need of help would be harmful. Because a refusal to render aid to those
in need would result in injury to countless accident victims and other unfortunates, Mill
would approve of coercive Good Samaritan laws.
4. Communitarians as primarily concerned with the well being of the social group,
would likely approve of compulsory bone marrow donation, and of Good Samaritan laws.
Both of these laws impose relatively minor burdens on individuals when compared to the
potential benefits they confer on society. Mandatory bone marrow donation has the
potential to save a great many lives. Every time an individual in a society dies, that
society loses some value. By implementing a means of protecting the lives of its
constituent parts, a society is protecting its resources. Because society’s rights supersede
the rights of its individuals, society can make a claim over the individual’s bone marrow.
Communitarians would support Good Samaritan laws for the same reason. Good
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Samaritan laws impede on individual rights, but they save lives. This benefits the
society, and because society’s rights supersede individual rights, society can coerce
rescue. Moreover, Communitarians would argue that Good Samaritan laws encourage a
strengthening of social bonds by forcing people to help one another. This strengthening
of social bonds is a benefit to the community, and justifies the imposition on individual
liberties.
The next subsection will look at the disparities between the analogies, and will look
for a pattern to describe how government should respond to the doomsday scenario.

C. Disparities between the analogies

All of the analogies were structurally similar to one another, and to the doomsday
scenario. The government compels an individual to confer a benefit on another to that
individual’s detriment despite the fact that the individual is not responsible for the initial
harm. Regardless of this structural similarity, two analogous situations allow for
government coercion and two do not. Similarly, two of the cases we looked at permitted
the government to coerce an individual for health reasons, but one did not. Because the
structural set-up of the scenarios was so similar in all of these cases, it must not be the
guiding force behind policy. Neither does it appear as though the possible ethical
frameworks are the guiding force behind policy.
In all four above analogies, the Kantian framework would not have permitted
government coercion, therefore it can’t be used to explain why the government is
permitted to coerce in the contexts of the draft and compelled testimony, but not in the
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contexts of the Good Samaritan law or mandatory bone marrow donation. Additionally,
Kant was not appealed to in either compelled quarantine in Barmore or compelled
inoculation in Jacobson. The only use of the Kantian framework appears to have been in
McFall and potentially in the contexts of the Good Samaritan law and compulsory bone
marrow donation. Similarly, Social Contract theory, Utilitarianism, and
Communitarianism would all have permitted government coercion in the four analogies.
Consequently, they can’t be used to explain why the government is allowed to coerce in
some scenarios and not in others. Furthermore, Social Contract theory, Utilitarianism,
and Communitarianism could all have been used in McFall to justify the compulsory
bone marrow donation, yet the court refused to apply any of them. While the court in
McFall did not appeal to these theories, the courts in Barmore and Jacobson appealed to
all of them to justify government intervention in the public health arena. The seemingly
inconsistent application of these ethical frameworks makes it difficult to explain why
government coercion is allowed in some cases, but not in others, and makes it difficult to
extrapolate a means for dealing with the doomsday scenario.
Neither the structure of the analogies nor the ethical frameworks employed
explain why government coercion is acceptable in some scenarios but not in others. The
factor which appears to be decisive in government response is the exigencies of the
circumstances. The appeal to practical considerations explains all of the variance between
the cases, and the analogies. In the situations where the government is not permitted to
coerce, the consequences of not coercing individuals do not endanger the society, but are
relatively minor.

40

In McFall, and in the case of compulsory bone marrow donation, the
consequences of not allowing government compulsion are minor. It seems rare that a
family member who is a bone marrow match will refuse to donate that material. Thus, the
number of lives put at risk by the decision in McFall is very small. Additionally, even
though mandatory bone marrow donation could potentially save many lives, the
consequences of those deaths for society as a whole are small. Society survived for
centuries without the ability to transplant bone marrow from one individual to another.
Because of this simple historical fact, there is little worry that society’s survival is
threatened by not coercing bone marrow donations.
Just as in the bone marrow context, Bad Samaritans don’t threaten society itself.
Most of us want to believe, rightly or wrongly, that people will rescue others whether or
not a law imposes a duty on them to do so. Because of this belief, the impact of not
imposing a duty to rescue seems very small. While not imposing a duty to rescue
probably results in a number of lives lost every year, again this loss does not even come
close to threatening society’s stability. Where there is little worry that the community will
be substantially weakened, it appears that the government is not permitted to intervene in
the autonomy interest of individuals. However, where there is a grave risk, intervention
will be allowed.
Compelled quarantine and inoculation were both approved of by the courts in
Barmore and Jacobson respectively. These two situations presented a substantial risk to
communities. In the early 20th century, Typhoid and small pox presented substantial
concerns. Medicine had not progressed to the level of being able to effectively treat
Typhoid, and small pox even to this day remains a terrifying boogeyman which we fear
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terrorists may unleash upon us. The courts, in granting the government coercive powers
to deal with these threats, were concerned about the survival of society if these diseases
were left completely unchecked. A small pox epidemic would not only kill potentially
hundreds of thousands of people, but would leave thousands of orphans, could cripple the
national economy for years, and could threaten the ability of a democracy to operate.
These potentially community-shattering consequences were what justified government
interference with individual liberty.
The consequences of not permitting conscription into the military are similarly
severe. The draft is a mechanism for the government to shore-up the military in desperate
circumstances. If the government were not able to compel people to join the military
where necessary, the government could not protect national security. Society risks
annihilation at the hands of foreign powers if it is not able to conscript soldiers. It is this
total risk to the community which justifies the government’s ability to intervene in its
citizens’ autonomy.
Compelled testimony is similarly necessary to stave off potentially societycrippling ills. While many people are willing to testify in criminal trials, if the
government lacked the ability to compel testimony it is possible that the willingness to
testify would dissipate. People know that if they don’t voluntarily cooperate with the
court, they can be held in contempt. Moreover, criminals know that threats to witnesses
are likely to be ineffective because the government can equally threaten witnesses as well
as protect them through the witness relocation program. With our society’s deference to
the defendant, it is possible that many criminal prosecutions would become unsuccessful.
While we aren’t sure what would happen in this counter-factual scenario, it is reasonable
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to believe that crime would increase, and that society’s functioning would be
substantially impaired. It is this pragmatic fear which justifies the government’s
intervention in the liberty of its citizens in the case of compelled testimony.
Where pragmatic concerns are the driving force behind allowing government to
intervene in the lives of individuals, it appears as though government would be granted
near carte blanche in the doomsday scenario. As argued earlier, the government’s interest
in halting a highly lethal, highly contagious pandemic is perhaps second only to its
interest in avoiding nuclear war. The potential consequence of not forcing Jane and her
cohort to submit to research is a near total collapse of society. Even though forcing Jane
and her cohort into research might result in their deaths, where those deaths could save
the lives of millions, a pragmatic calculation must give the government the power to
compel Jane.74
Having answered the question of whether or not Jane et al can be compelled in the
doomsday scenario in the affirmative, all we are left with is the debate over which ethical
framework to use to justify that decision.

D. Is a pragmatic approach really an unprincipled approach?

The seeming discrepancies between the ethical approaches applied in the analogies
and in the court cases expose the fact that in reality public health law does not fit neatly
within any single ethical framework. The so called pragmatic framework is really much
more of a communitarian framework tempered by a deep respect for individual autonomy
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and rights.75 The confusing outcomes between the court cases and the analogies is due to
the fact that while the courts recognize public health law’s connection to communitarian
principles, the letter of the law itself is much more based in liberal principles. This
disconnect helps to explain why on the one hand the government can force young men to
go to war, but on the other hand can’t force people to rescue their fellow citizens even
when the risk of rescuing is low. The disconnect between communitarian policy and
liberal law can be seen in the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny approach to coercion in the
public health context.
The Supreme Court’s three pronged approach, which looks at whether the
government has a compelling interest, whether the ends are closely related to the means,
and whether a less restrictive approach is possible, by not including a balancing element,
is based in a liberal ethical framework. The first prong of the test does involve some
consideration of the benefits of the potential government coercion to the community as a
whole. Unfortunately, because the 3 part test is an element test, no matter how
compelling the government’s interest is, if either of the second two elements to the test is
not met then the Court can not allow the government to coerce. This strong deference to
individual rights does not interfere with effective public health response in the case of
well known dangers such as small pox. This is because we have data that helps us to
make an accurate ends/means calculation, and because we know the least intrusive means
of achieving our public health goals. The problem is that in circumstances such as the
doomsday scenario the Court’s approach wouldn’t work effectively. As discussed earlier
75

It is actually hard to say whether the public health laws are communitarian in nature, but consider the
impact of coercion of individuals on the community’s overall well being, or if the public health laws are a
combination of liberal and communitarian ideals. In the former circumstance respect for individuals is only
considered because of its impact on the community, whereas in the latter respect for individuals is
intrinsically valuable.

44

in the article, government coercion of Jane and her cohort would probably not pass the
Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny approach. However, Jane and her cohort would probably
still be coerced into participating in the research because the exigencies of the
circumstances would require their sacrifice even if the ends/means analysis showed that
experimenting on Jane and her cohort had a very small likelihood of achieving a
generalizeable treatment in time. As the old adage goes, “bad facts lead to bad (or
inconsistent) law.” The real ethical driver behind public health law, communitarian
principles tempered by a respect for individual autonomy, would lead the Supreme Court
to come up with a long and tortured justification for coercing Jane and her group, which
would be confusing, inconsistent with precedent, and inconsistent with their prior
formulation of strict scrutiny in the public health context. In order to avoid confusion the
Court should adopt a new test for government coercion in the public health context,
which acknowledges the communitarian roots of public health policy while still paying
deference to the rights of individuals. The next section suggests what a new test might
look like.

E. Possible future approaches to the doomsday scenario.

A new test for determining when and under what circumstance the government
may coerce one of its citizens into participating in dangerous research for the benefit of
the public health, must be able to quickly and consistently address the whole range of
possible public health emergencies. Nancy Kass, a bioethicist at Johns Hopkins School of
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Public Health, has suggested a six step analysis for potential coercive public health
interventions.76
This six step analysis seeks to carefully balance the needs and concerns of the
public against the rights of the individual. Step one of the analysis is for the goal of the
planned public health intervention to be determined.77 The second step of the analysis is
to evaluate the likely effectiveness of the planned intervention in achieving the identified
goals of the intervention.78 These first two analytical steps are critical in determining the
kind and degree of benefit that the community can expect from the proposed coercive
interventions. For instance, a proposed quarantine of HIV positive individuals would not
be particularly effective at stopping the spread of HIV because it is not a particularly
contagious virus.79 The third step suggested by Nancy Kass is to assess the burdens
placed on individuals by the proposed coercive action.80 This step is critical because this
is where the liberal ethical considerations over individual autonomy and an individual’s
right to bodily integrity come into play. The fourth step in the analysis is to consider
whether the burdens placed on individuals can be reduced while still effectively
achieving the goals of the planned public health intervention.81 Nancy Kass, in asking
whether the harm to individuals can be reduced while still gaining the public health
benefit, again recognizes the importance of individual rights while still focusing on the
rights of the community to be protected from disease. The fifth step is to determine how
to implement the planned public health intervention in a fair manor and in a way which
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avoids groundless discrimination.82 The final step in the analysis proposed by Kass is to
ask whether the benefits of the proposed coercive action outweigh the costs of the
action.83 This final step in the analysis takes into consideration all of the answers from the
previous five steps and makes a holistic evaluation as to whether or not the proposed
coercive public health intervention is the best course of action. This determination is
based on both the interests of the community (Communitarian framework), and the
interests of the individuals whose rights are to be impeded (liberal/Kantian framework).
Would Kass’ analytical framework conclude that coercion of Jane and her cohorts is
acceptable under the doomsday scenario?
The goal of coercing Jane and her cohort to participate in research in the doomsday
scenario is to try to devise some sort of treatment for the illness, or to learn how to
immunize others against the illness. The likelihood of achieving this goal by pressuring
Jane and her cohort to participate in research is very small over a short period of time. At
some point the deadly pandemic would likely burn itself out, thus, the most important
goal is to devise a treatment quickly. On the other hand, one of the goals of coercive
research would be to understand the illness better and to eventually devise a treatment.
This less urgent goal would likely be helped by the coercion of Jane and her cohort. The
third step in Kass’ analysis would assess the burdens placed on Jane and her group by
coercive research. The doomsday hypothetical supposes that these burdens are very high
over and above the standard burdens of confinement and lack of self-determination. Jane
will be subject to potentially painful and injurious experimentation. The fourth step in the
analysis asks what can be done to reduce the burdens placed on Jane. Unfortunately, in
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the doomsday hypothetical, time is of the essence and so it would be difficult to
substantially meliorate the burdens of the research. Jane and her group could certainly be
offered substantial compensation for their forced participation, and all efforts at safety
and pain reduction could be taken, but it would be difficult to avoid all discomfort.
Moreover, the substantial burden of confinement against one’s will could not be
substantially reduced, no matter how nice the accommodations were made for Jane and
her group. The fifth step in the analysis, which asks that the intervention be as fair as
possible would determine that the intervention was being fairly targeted to those
individuals who are most likely to be able to provide some sort of public health benefit by
being subjected to research. The final part of the analysis would be to weigh all of the
potential costs of coercing Jane and her cohort into injurious research against all of the
potential benefits that the research could produce. The costs include not only the
individual burdens born by Jane and her group, but also include the costs imposed on the
community in allowing some members of the community to be coerced for the benefit of
the other members of the community. These costs would then be weighed against the
benefit that the community could receive from successful research multiplied by
whatever the probability of success for that research is. While the probability of success
is low, the great potential benefit of successful research in the doomsday scenario would
mean that under Kass’ analysis the government should be allowed to coerce Jane and her
group.
Kass’ analytical method does a good job of recognizing the important elements,
which must be considered both from a Communitarian and from a Liberal/Kantian ethical
framework. Moreover, her analytical method could easily be incorporated into the United
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States’ public health decision making process. The Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny
approach in the public health context could be modified to include consideration of all of
Kass’ steps simply by changing it into a factor analysis and by adding a fourth factor,
which would weigh the costs of the coercion against the potential benefits. The first
factor in the modified Supreme Court test would be whether or not the government has a
compelling interest in coercing the individual. This factor would essentially set a
threshold. When government interests did not pass the threshold established by this
factor, the Court’s analysis would be more heavily influenced by a Liberal/Kantian
ethical framework, which would value individual autonomy over community interests.
However, if the government’s interest in coercing the individual surpassed the threshold,
the Court would be more heavily influenced by communitarian considerations. The
second factor in the modified test would be the ends/means comparison. The ends/means
comparison basically replaces the first two steps in Kass’ method by asking what the
goals of the government’s coercion would be, what the probability of achieving those
goals is, and whether the proposed coercive method is the best method for achieving the
goals. Additionally, the ends/means question also addresses Kass’ fifth step by making
sure that the coercive method is sufficiently targeted towards achieving the government’s
compelling interest. If the means of achieving the government’s interest are
discriminatory then they are not as highly targeted as they can be, and the Court should
find that the means are not closely related enough to the ends. Thus, unjustifiably
discriminatory coercive practices would not survive the modified Supreme Court test.
The third factor in the modified Supreme Court test would look at whether the proposed
coercive action is the least restrictive means of achieving the government’s purpose. This
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factor correlates closely with Kass’ fourth step, and ensures that the government will take
all available steps to reduce the burdens on the individual. The fourth and final factor in
the modified Supreme Court test is a cost benefit analysis. This factor mirrors Kass’ sixth
step and also ensures that the Court considers Kass’ third step, which was an assessment
of the costs likely to be imposed on the coerced individuals.
This modified test, if implemented by the Supreme Court in a future case or if
imposed by congress, would be able to respond to public health questions in a consistent
manner. By still requiring the government to meet the threshold of having a compelling
interest in the coercive act, the Court grants a strong degree of deference to principles of
individual autonomy. Moreover, the second and third factors of the Court’s modified test
protect individuals against capricious or discriminatory actions. Despite all of these
protections for the rights of individuals, the fourth factor, which requires the Court to
balance the interests of the community against the rights of the individuals grants the
Court the ability to protect the public’s health and to ensure that the rights of
communities against unnecessary dangers can be protected. If Congress or the courts
were to adopt this modified test, the agencies responsible for public health would
undoubtedly adapt their regulations to conform with the new test so that the U.S. public
health system as a whole could consistently respond to difficult ethical public health
questions.
The biggest criticism of the proposed modified test is that by introducing a
balancing test into the court’s analysis the modified approach potentially creates a
slippery slope problem. Somebody can almost always plausibly argue that society can be
benefited as a whole by the coercion of a couple of individuals. For instance one could
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argue that the community benefits if it forces one citizen to donate all of their organs, if
those organs save the lives of two or more other people. However, this slippery slope
argument can only be made if someone looks at the modified test in the most superficial
of ways. The balancing factor in the modified test must consider all of the costs
associated with a coercive action. These costs include the social and moral costs that
would inevitably come from a decision to allow society to murder one individual for the
benefit of several others. Consequently, the modified test suggested herein would be
unlikely to lead to any results generally considered unconscionable by either a
Liberal/Kantian or Communitarian ethical framework.

Part IV
Conclusion

The doomsday scenario must permit governmental coercion. While this may be the
case, it is still critical that the question of whether or not Jane and her cohort can be
compelled is publicly debated and settled before the doomsday scenario arrives in reality.
As argued in the introduction, settling the question beforehand avoids several ethical
problems, and allows the government to respond to an unparalleled emergency with the
appropriate rapidity.
It may seem that past public health decisions have been made based purely on
pragmatic concerns and not based on adherence to a particular ethical framework. This
perception is created because the courts have not relied on a single ethical framework, but
have incorporated elements of many different frameworks into their decisions.
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Ultimately, it does not matter what ethical frameworks would be used in the
decision making process regarding the doomsday scenario. The main purpose of ethical
frameworks is to facilitate human interaction and cooperation. As Thomas Hobbes
argued, ethical norms allow men to rise from the state of nature and to build connections
with one another. Their purpose is to facilitate human advancement.84 However, when an
external force such as a lethal pandemic arises which has the potential to force humans
back into the state of nature, all other ethical imperatives must be pushed aside until the
external threat is dealt with. When human society and development itself is threatened,
all ethical rules which impede human society’s defense must perish before the imperative
that humans survive.85
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